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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 990377-CA 
vs. : 
Priority No. 2 
ANNA MARIE MORGAN, : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals her conviction on one count of possession of a controlled 
substance, methamphetamine, with intent to distribute, a second degree felony in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(iii) (1998), and one count of possession of 
a controlled substance, marijuana, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1998). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVDZW 
1. Whether defendant's rights to due process under the Utah Constitution were 
violated when, following a magistrate's decision not to bind defendant over on a charge 
due to the prosecutor's miscalculation of the evidence required for bindover, the State 
immediately refiled the charge before the same magistrate, and presented additional 
evidence to support the charge. 
The trial court's decision to deny defendant's motion to dismiss is subject to a 
bifurcated standard of review: the court's factual findings are reviewed for clear error, 
and the legal standard applied by the trial court is reviewed for correctness. "On 
review, we give no deference to the trial court's determination that defendant's due 
process rights were not violated; however, we presume that the factual findings 
underlying that determination are correct." State v. Parra 972 P.2d 924, 927 (Utah 
App. 1998) {citing State v. Mincy, 838 P.2d 648, 657 (Utah App. 1992)). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Const, art. I, § 7: 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, 
without due process of law. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On January 19, 1998, defendant was charged with one count of possession of a 
controlled substance, methamphetamine, with intent to distribute, a second degree 
felony, and one count of possession of a controlled substance, marijuana, a class B 
misdemeanor (Case #981200247FS, R.l) (hereinafter, "Case I"). At a preliminary 
hearing, the magistrate amended the methamphetamine charge to simple possession, a 
third degree felony, and bound defendant over on both charges (May 6, 1998 
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preliminary hearing transcript, pp. 34-35) (hereinafter, "Prelim. F attached as 
Addendum A). The State moved to reopen the preliminary hearing or, in the 
alternative, to dismiss. The magistrate denied the request to reopen the hearing, and 
the charges were dismissed (June 3, 1998 motion hearing transcript, p.6). 
On June 10, 1998, the same charges were filed alleging possession of 
methamphetamine with intent to distribute and possession of marijuana (Case 
#981201030FS, R.3) (hereinafter, "Case IF). Defendant was bound over on these 
charges, and convicted of both at a jury trial (Case II, R.79, 80). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On January 19, 1998, Officer Eric Lindquist, while on patrol in Salt Lake 
County, checked the registration on a vehicle he observed. Upon discovering that it 
was not insured, Lindquist stopped the vehicle and approached the driver (July 29, 
1998 preliminary hearing transcript, p. 4) (hereinafter, "Prelim. IF). Defendant, who 
was a passenger, told Lindquist that she was the owner of the vehicle (Prelim II, p. 5). 
She had no insurance paperwork, so Lindquist checked the driver's licenses of both the 
driver and defendant, and discovered that there were warrants for the arrest of both 
(Prelim. II, p. 6). Lindquist arrested defendant and die driver, and then searched the 
vehicle (Prelim. II, p. 6). In diis search, Lindquist found a large bag of 
methamphetamine (containing 39.1 grams) under the driver's seat, and a baggie of 
marijuana in the glove compartment (Prelim. II, pp. 7, 10). Lindquist also found five 
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empty one inch by one inch plastic baggies in defendant's purse, along with some 
plastic wrap and other baggies which appeared to contain methamphetamine 
(approximately five grams) (Prelim. II, pp. 7, 10-11). 
Defendant was charged with possession of methamphetamine with intent to 
distribute and possession of marijuana (Case I, R. 1). A preliminary hearing on these 
charges was held before the Hon. Michael K. Burton, acting as magistrate (Prelim. I, 
p. 1). At the hearing, the State had two witnesses available, Officer Lindquist and 
Detective Scott Hansen, both of whom were sworn in as the hearing began (Prelim. I, 
p.3). Officer Lindquist testified to the facts of his search of defendant's vehicle, and 
that he recognized that the substance found in the bag as narcotics. Defendant objected 
to this testimony based on a lack of foundation for Lindquist's ability to recognize 
narcotics, but the court overruled the objection based upon Lindquist's testimony that 
he had been trained to recognize narcotics as part of his peace officer training (Prelim. 
I, pp. 12-13). 
Lindquist was then asked by the prosecutor to offer an opinion as to whether the 
facts indicated that defendant had the intent to distribute the methamphetamine. 
Lindquist testified that "[b]ased upon my training and experience, it's my opinion that 
due to the amount and the bag found underneath the seat and the other plastic baggies, 
that that substance would probably be separated into smaller bags and sold for profit" 
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(Prelim. I, p. 16). Defendant did not object to the foundation for this testimony, and 
the evidence was admitted. 
The prosecutor did not call his other witness, submitting the bindover issue 
based upon Lindquist's testimony. The magistrate refused to bind defendant over on 
the charge of possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, instead 
amending the charge to simple possession and binding over on this charge, along with 
the marijuana possession charge (Prelim. I, p. 36). The prosecutor immediately 
indicated that he had "assumed'' that Lindquist's testimony would be sufficient to 
support the allegation that defendant intended to sell the methamphetamine, since the 
testimony as to his opinion about defendant's intent to distribute had been admitted in 
evidence (Prelim. I, pp. 36-37). The court explained that there was insufficient 
foundation for Lindquist's testimony as to defendant's intent, as the court felt that he 
did not appear to have sufficient experience to support a conclusion regarding intent 
(Prelim. I, p. 37). The prosecutor then sought to have Detective Hansen, who had 
been previously sworn in and was present in the courtroom, testify on that issue either 
that day or later. The court denied this request, apparently on jurisdictional grounds, 
reasoning that the bindover had been ordered and the case therefore was transferred to 
the District Court (Prelim. I, p. 38). 
Following the hearing, the prosecutor filed a memorandum in support of his oral 
motion to re-open, again requesting that the magistrate re-open the preliminary hearing 
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for purposes of presenting Detective Hansen's testimony (Case I, R.16). In the 
alternative, the prosecutor requested that the magistrate dismiss the charges in order to 
refile them and conduct an entirely new preliminary hearing (Case I, R.16). At a 
hearing held on June 3, 1998, the magistrate denied the motion to re-open the 
preliminary hearing, and then dismissed the charges pursuant to the prosecutor's 
request (June 3, 1998 hearing transcript, p.6). 
A new information charging possession of methamphetamine with intent to 
distribute and possession of marijuana was filed, and a new preliminary hearing was 
held before the same magistrate, Judge Burton, who had conducted the prior hearing. 
At this hearing, Officer Lindquist again testified concerning the traffic stop and his 
discovery of methamphetamine and marijuana in defendant's car and purse (Prelim. II, 
pp. 3-21). Detective Hansen also testified to his opinion, based upon his years of 
experience in drug investigations, that the amounts and packaging of the 
methamphetamine indicated that defendant had the intent to distribute (Prelim. II, pp. 
23-26). Based upon this testimony, the magistrate bound defendant over on both 
charges. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
There is no limit imposed on a prosecutor's ability to refile criminal charges 
following a dismissal prior to trial, unless the refiling constitutes harassment or forum-
shopping in violation of a defendant's right to due process. In this case, the 
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prosecutor's actions do not constitute harassment, since the prosecutor innocently and 
reasonably miscalculated the amount of evidence required by the magistrate at the 
preliminary hearing, and upon learning of the magistrate's finding that there was 
insufficient evidence for bindover, sought immediately to provide additional testimony 
in support of the charge. There is likewise no allegation of forum-shopping, since upon 
refiling the charge, the prosecutor presented the case, with additional testimony, to the 
same magistrate who refused to bind over on the original charge. 
Under the supreme court's decision in State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 
1986), a prosecutor may refile a case which a magistrate has refused to bind over if the 
new charge is presented to the same magistrate, and there is "good cause" for the 
refiling. Brickey itself acknowledges that an innocent miscalculation by the prosecutor 
at the initial preliminary hearing of the amount of evidence required for bindover would 
constitute "good cause" for refiling. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS WAS NOT VIOLATED 
BY REFILING OF CHARGES UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS 
CASE, AS THERE WAS GOOD CAUSE FOR THE STATE'S 
FAILURE TO PRESENT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE AT THE FIRST 
PRELIMINARY HEARING 
Defendant argues that the State's refiling of the charges in this case violated her 
right to due process under the Utah State Constitution as explained in State v. Brickey, 
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714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986). See Appellant's Brief, pp. 4-5. In Brickey, the Utah 
Supreme Court held that, although the dismissal of an information does not preclude the 
State from refiling the charges,1 due process imposes some limits on the State's ability 
to refile charges in order to prevent an overzealous prosecutor from refiling charges 
simply to harass a defendant. The actions of the prosecutor in this case do not, 
however, in any way imply an attempt to harass defendant, and Brickey itself 
acknowledges that charges may be refiled in a case such as this, where a prosecutor 
innocently miscalculates the amount of evidence necessary for bindover. 
1. There is no evidence or implication of harassment in this case. 
Brickey makes clear that it is the possibility of harassment which implicates a 
defendant's right to due process when a prosecutor re files a criminal charge which has 
been dismissed following a preliminary hearing. 
The fact that a subsequent prosecution is not barred by the double 
jeopardy clause does not mean, however, that the State is free to refile 
criminal charges under all circumstances. For if this is the case, the State 
could easily harass defendants by refiling criminal charges which had 
previously been dismissed for insufficient evidence. Considerations of 
fundamental fairness preclude vesting the State with such unbridled 
discretion. 
1
 Utah R. Crim. P. 7(h)(3) specifically provides that dismissal of an information 
and discharge of a defendant for lack of evidence at a preliminary hearing "does not 
preclude the state from instituting a subsequent prosecution for the same offense." 
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Brickey, 714 P.2d at 646. The Brickey court expressed concern that a prosecutor 
lacking sufficient evidence to satisfy one magistrate could simply take the same case 
from court to court in search of a more sympathetic ear. "'[A] criminal prosecution 
must not be shuttled from one magistrate to another simply because a county attorney is 
not satisfied with the action of the magistrate in the precinct whose jurisdiction was first 
invoked.'" Id. (quoting Wilson v. Garrett, 448 P.2d 857 (Ariz. 1969). In Brickey, the 
prosecutor had admitted that "he was forum-shopping simply because he disagreed with 
the decision of the judge who presided at the first preliminary hearing." Id. It is this 
possibility of harassment which the court addressed in Brickey, and "[t]o curb such 
abusive practices," the court imposed a due process limitation on refiling. Id. 
No hint of harassment of this defendant or lack of good faith by the prosecutor 
exists in this case. The prosecutor brought two witnesses to the initial preliminary 
hearing, both of whom were sworn in at the beginning of the hearing. Based upon his 
training and experience, the first officer testified, without objection or rebuttal, that the 
amount and packaging of the methamphetamine indicated an intent to distribute. At 
that point, the prosecutor reasonably decided that similar testimony from the other 
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officer would be cumulative at this stage of the proceedings, even though the second 
officer had much more experience with drug investigations.2 
Accordingly, although the magistrate disagreed with the prosecutor as to whether 
there was sufficient foundation for the first officer's testimony, there is no implication 
that the prosecutor acted in bad faith by failing to call his second witness. Indeed, 
following the magistrate's oral ruling, the prosecutor immediately sought to put his 
additional witness on the stand (Prelim. I, p. 38). The only reason that there was any 
delay in resolving the issue of whether defendant should be bound over on the charge 
2
 The prosecutor's evaluation of the sufficiency of Lindquist's testimony to 
support the charge actually appears correct. "In determining whether this standard of 
probable cause has been satisfied, 'the magistrate should view the evidence in a light 
most favorable to the prosecution and resolve all inferences in favor of the prosecution.' 
Additionally, 'unless the evidence is wholly lacking and incapable of reasonable 
inference to prove some issue which supports the [prosecution's] claim, the magistrate 
should bind the defendant over for trial.'" State v. Talbot, 972 P.2d 435 (Utah 1998) 
(citations omitted). Officer Lindquist's testimony, based upon his training and 
experience, was unequivocal and unrebutted. Although the magistrate questioned 
whether there was sufficient foundation for the testimony, the testimony was admitted 
as evidence without any objection (Prelim. I, pp. 15-16). No inquiry was made into the 
nature of Lindquist's knowledge and experience regarding this issue, since no objection 
to the foundation for the testimony was made. Assuming an expert opinion is 
admissible, a magistrate's doubts about its ultimate credibility cannot be used to deny a 
bindover. Talbot, 972 P.2d at 439 n. 1. 
Indeed, the bare facts of the packaging of the methamphetamine into small 
baggies and the presence of empty baggies provides a reasonable inference of an intent 
to distribute quite apart from Lindquist's opinion. See Evans v. State, 963 P.2d 177 
(Utah 1998) ("the evidence required for binding a defendant over to district court is 
relatively low because the assumption is that the prosecution's case will only get stronger 
as the investigation continues."). 
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was the magistrate's refusal to allow the prosecutor to put on his additional witness 
during that initial hearing.3 In addition, following the refiling of the charges, the 
prosecutor went to the same magistrate, and called the same two witnesses who were 
sworn in at the first preliminary hearing. Accordingly, the forum-shopping problem 
which existed in Brickey is absent here. 
The facts of this case show only an innocent miscalculation of the amount of 
evidence necessary for a bindover and a prosecutor's good faith effort to meet his 
burden of proof. The possibility of prosecutorial harassment and abuse of a defendant's 
right to due process which was addressed by the court in Brickey is simply not evident 
in this case. See People v. Walls, 324 N.W.2d 136, 138 (Mich. App. 1982) (due 
3
 Nothing precludes a magistrate from hearing additional witnesses at a 
preliminary hearing merely because he has already stated his view that there was 
insufficient evidence presented. Stockwell v. State, 573 P.2d 116, 121 (Idaho 1977) 
(finding that a magistrate abused his discretion in refusing to allow the state to reopen 
its case under similar circumstances; "the procedures to be followed in a preliminary 
hearing are not so formal that if a magistrate has decided that the evidence which the 
prosecutor thought was adequate to show probable cause was not sufficient to convince 
the magistrate that there was probable cause the prosecutor has lost or forfeited all right 
to introduce additional evidence upon that issue even when he has additional witnesses 
who were present and available to testify and can proceed to introduce additional 
evidence without delay."). See also Harper v. District Court, 484 P.2d 891, 897 
(Okla. 1971) ("in the event the prosecutor miscalculates and fails to present sufficient 
evidence to show probable cause to bind over die accused, but possesses other 
witnesses whose testimony would strengthen his showing, it is clearly within the 
discretion of the examining magistrate to grant the state a continuance for that purpose. 
However, it is presumed that the additional witnesses, or other evidence, are 
reasonably available; and that a continuance will not be sought in order to conduct 
further investigation seeking that evidence, in a dilatory manner"). 
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process violated by prosecutor when the facts clearly show an attempt to forum-shop 
and to harass and punish defendant by raising the degree of the charges following an 
initial adverse ruling). 
2. An innocent miscalculation of the evidence necessary for bindover is a generally 
acknowledged justification for refiling of charges. 
The Brickey court addressed the possibility of abusive prosecutorial practices by 
adopting the rule applied by the Oklahoma court in Jones v. State, 481 P.2d 169 (Okla. 
Crim. App. 1971). "[D]ue process considerations prohibit a prosecutor from refiling 
criminal charges earlier dismissed for insufficient evidence unless the prosecutor can 
show that new or previously unavailable evidence has surfaced or that other good cause 
justifies refiling." Brickey, 714 P.2d at 647 {citing Jones, 481 P.2d at 171). The court 
then specifically noted that 
the Oklahoma court clarified Jones, holding that good cause to continue a 
preliminary hearing for further investigation might exist when a 
prosecutor innocently miscalculates the quantum of evidence required to 
obtain a bindover and further investigation would not be dilatory. 
Brickey, l\4t P.2d at 648 n. 5. Thus, the Brickey court went out of its way to 
acknowledge that an innocent miscalculation of the amount of evidence required for 
bindover constitutes "good cause" to allow the prosecutor to refile. See also State v. 
Rivera, 871 P.2d 1023, 1025 (Utah App. 1994), rev'd on other grounds, 906 P.2d 311 
(Utah 1995) (finding that the State could refile the case if a bindover were reversed for 
12 
lack of evidence, and characterizing Brickey as indicating that a miscalculation of the 
evidence required for bindover is good cause for refiling). 
Other jurisdictions follow this rule. In Stockwell v. State, 573 P.2d 116 (Idaho 
1977) (cited with approval in Brickey), the Idaho Supreme Court was presented with a 
factual situation virtually identical to this case. The defendant had been charged with 
second degree murder for shooting his friend in an altercation during which both 
defendant and the victim were drunk. After the evidence had been presented at the 
preliminary hearing, the magistrate indicated that, based upon the evidence presented, 
he would reduce the murder charge to manslaughter due to the defendant's high blood 
alcohol level. 
As in this case, the prosecutor immediately asked to reopen the state's case in 
order to present additional testimony on the impairment issue from witnesses who 
were then available to testify. The magistrate refused to hear the additional evidence 
on the grounds that the state had rested its case, and bound defendant over on the 
reduced manslaughter charge. The prosecutor then had the case dismissed, and refiled 
the original charge in order to present the additional testimony at a new preliminary 
hearing. 
On appeal from the trial court's grant of the defendant's habeas corpus petition 
challenging the refiled charges, the Idaho Supreme Court held that defendant's due 
process rights were not violated by the prosecutor's actions. This ruling was based 
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upon the court's finding that "the record in this case does not suggest that the dismissal 
and refiling of the charge was done for harassment or delay or because the prosecutor 
had made no effort to present available evidence at the first preliminary hearing." 
Stockwell, 573 P.2d at 126. See also Walker v. Schneider, 411 N.W.2d 167, 175 
(N.D. 1991) (good cause for refiling charges includes "when a prosecutor innocently 
miscalculates the quantum or type of evidence required to obtain a bindover and 
further investigation clearly would not be dilatory"); People v. Laslo, 259 N.W.2d 
448, 450 (Mich. App. 1977) (although charges had been twice dismissed by the 
magistrate for lack of evidence at a preliminary hearing, a third refiling was allowed 
because the failure to present sufficient evidence at the prior hearings was due to the 
prosecutor's "ineptness" rather than forum-shopping or harassment). 
In this case, the prosecutor did everything required of him, as efficiently and 
fairly as possible, to remedy an innocent miscalculation of the evidence required by 
the magistrate to support his case at the preliminary hearing. Defendant's right to due 
process was not violated by the refiling of this charge.4 
4
 Defendant also argues that her trial counsel's failure to take an interlocutory 
appeal of the bindover issue constitutes inadequate assistance of counsel, presumably in 
anticipation that the State might argue that defendant's failure to appeal the bindover 
prior to trial renders the issue moot because of her subsequent conviction. See State v. 
Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 688, 694 n. 3 (Utah App. 1995); State v. Quas, 837 P.2d 565 (Utah 
App. 1992). However, the State does not make this argument under the circumstances 
of this case, and defendant has therefore not been prejudiced by her counsel's failure to 
file an interlocutory appeal. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, defendant's convictions should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2^-flay of September, 1999. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
SCOTT KEITH WILSON 
Assistant Attorney General 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
. IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, MURRAY DEPARTMENT 
. SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
I 
a I -ooo-
4 I STATE OF UTAH, 
s , Plaintiff, 
6 I VSJ 
7 I ANNA MARIE MORGAN, 
Defendant. 
-0O0-
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
Case NO. 981200247FS 
PRELIMINARY HEARING 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 6th day of May, 
1998, the above-entitled matter came on for hearing 
before the HONORABLE MICHAEL K. BURTON, sitting as Judge 
in the above-named Court for the purpose of this cause, 
and that the following proceedings were had. 
-oOo-
A P P E A R A N C E S 
For the State: DAVID S. WALSH 
Deputy Salt Lake County 
District Attorney 
2001 South State, #S-3700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190 
For the Defendant: ROGER K. SCOWCROFT 
Attorney at Law 
Salt Lake Legal Defender 
Association 
t4 East 500 South, #300 
lit Lake City, Utah 84111 FJLEU; 
24
 J'JU - 2 12S9 
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COUfif OF APPEALS ^ f l ^ T T - C ^ 
ORIGINAL 
ALAN P SMITH, CSR 
385 BRAHMA DRIVE (801) 266 0320 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84107 
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2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
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I N D E X 
WITNESS FOR THE STATE 
ERIC LINDQUIST 
Direct Examination by Mr. Walsh 
Cross-Examination by Mr. Scowcroft 
Redirect Examination by Mr. Walsh 
STATE RESTS 
CLOSING ARGUMENT BY MR. SCOWCROFT 
* * * 
E X H I B I T 
Number Identified 
Exhibit S-l 14 
* * * 
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Page 
5 
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32 
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6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
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P R O 
THE 
I Marie Morgan who's here 
MR. 
THE 
represents the State. 
MR. 
[ THE 
C E E D I N G S 
COURT: That leaves us with Anna 
with Mr. Scowcroft— 
SCOWCROFT: Yes. 
COURT: —and Mr. Walsh 
WALSH: We call— 
COURT: Looks like we have 
Detective Hansen here and I don't know the other officer. 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
witness, Judge. 
THE 
raise your right hands? 
WALSH: Officer Lindquist. 
COURT: Officer Lindquist. 
WALSH: We'll be calling him as a 
COURT: Why don't you gentlemen 
(Whereupon, the prospective witnesses were duly 
sworn by the clerk of the Court.) 
THE COURT: Now, he's going to ask 
Detective Hansen to stay with him; is that okay? 
MR. 
know how we are. 
THE 
overrule it, but— 
MR. 
SCOWCROFT: No. We object. You 
COURT: Well, I'm going to 
SCOWCROFT: Okay. That's fine. 
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THE COURT: You ought to stipulate 
when you know I'm going to overrule it. 
MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, gotta try, I 
guess. 
THE COURT: You gotta keep your form; 
even though you're retiring, you've got to keep your 
form, huh? 
MR. SCOWCROFT: I'm not retiring. 
THE COURT: You're retiring from 
secure, paid employment. 
MR. SCOWCROFT: True. 
THE COURT: Secure, somewhat paid 
employment. 
MR. SCOWCROFT: Yeah. 
THE COURT: Poorly paid employment. 
MR. SCOWCROFT: No, it's not that 
bad. It's a lot of work, but it's, you know. 
THE COURT: All right. Is Officer— 
the other officer going to start out? 
MR. WALSH: Yes, sir. 
Could I just have one moment? 
THE COURT: Sure. Why don't you come 
up, Officer, and take your seat? 
MR. WALSH: Thank you. 
* 
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ERIC LINDOUIST. 
I called as a witness by and on behalf of the State in this 
matter, after having been previously duly sworn, assumed 
the witness stand and was examined and testified as 
follows: 
BY_ 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
MR i WALSH? 
Q Would you state your name, sir, and spell your 
last name, please? 
of 
in 
A Eric Lindquist, L-i-n-d-q-u-i-s-t. 
Q And you're obviously employed with Murray City? 
A Yes. 
Q How long, sir, have you been so employed? 
A A little more than a year. 
Q Were you so employed on or about January 19th 
this year? 
A Yes. 
Q And on that date, did you have occasion to be 
the approximate vicinity of 601 West 4500 South? 
A Yes. 
Q Is that located in Salt Lake County? 
A Yes. 
Q Can you tell us, sir, what you were doing on 
that date at that location, please? 
A I was patrolling in the area and observed a 
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vehicle and conducted a traffic stop at that location. 
Q 
A 
Q 
Officer? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
And what—you stopped a vehicle? 
Yes, uh huh. 
And what happened once you stopped the vehicle, 
I made contact with the driver and— 
Do you know who that was? 
Can I look at my report? 
Sure. 
MR. SCOWCROFT: Could Officer 
Lindquist speak up a little bit? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
MR. SCOWCROFT: I just having a 
little trouble hearing you. Thank you very much. 
Perry. 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
us where 
THE WITNESS: The driver was Joseph 
(By Mr. Walsh) Anybody else in the vehicle? 
Yes. 
Who was that? 
Anna Morgan. 
And is she present in the courtroom today? 
Yes. 
Would you point her out to the Judge, telling 
she's sitting and what she's wearing, please? 
THE COURT: And Officer Lindquist, 
6 
1
 since Linda's the only other female and the name you've 
2
 given is a female name# I'll assume it's the lady in the 
3
 Levi jacket; is that right? 
4
 THE WITNESS: That is correct, 
5
 THE COURT: See how quick I am? I 
fi I 
u
 never amaze—I mean, I never cease to amaze myself 
7
 Q (By Mr. Walsh) So you stopped the vehicle and-
8
 I -and talked to the driver? 
A Yes. 
Q And based upon the conversation that you have 
with the driver, what do you do, sir? 
A I asked for proof of insurance, which was the 
reason for the stop, I asked for his driver's license 
14
 J information, if he had a driver's license, which I would 
15
 J have to look at my report. I, at any rate, I went back 
1
^ I to my car and ran his name through our dispatch. 
17
 I Q And did it come up that there were some 
warrants for him? 
19
 I A Yes. 
2 0
 I Q And so you were going to take him into custody? 
21
 A Yes. 
2 2
 I Q All right. What else were you going to do, 
2 3
 I sir? 
2 4
 A Can y o u — 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
25 Q Were you going to do something with the car? 
10 
11 
I A I was going to let it go to the passenger* 
p 
Q And pursuant to that, what did you do? I mean, 
1
 what did you do to make any determination about whether 
4
 the car should be released to--to Ms* Morgan? 
5
 A I asked her if she had a valid driver's license 
a I 
u
 and if she did, I was going to allow her to take it. 
7
 Q Okay* And during the course of these 
8
 discussions, did you attempt to determine who the owner 
9
 I of that vehicle was? 
A I was advised when I initially talked to the 
driver that Anna Morgan was the owner. 
12
 I Q And did you talk to her about that? 
13
 l A She told me—the only conversation I had had 
14
 with her to that point was when the driver told me that 
15
 ' she was the owner, she indicated that she was the owner 
1
^ and that the vehicle was insured. 
17
 I Q And so did you get her driver's license and 
attempt to verify its validity? 
A She—as I recall, she did not have a driver's 
license with her, so I ran her name and date of birth 
21
 I through our dispatch. 
22
 I Q And what did you find out when you did that? 
23
 I A That her driver's license was suspended for 
24
 | failure to appear. 
Q Okay 
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A 
Q 
A 
Q 
custody, 
A 
Q 
And that she had— 
And was there a warrant outstanding for her? 
Yes. 
Okay. So were you going to take her into 
too? 
Yes. 
And did you in fact arrest both of these 
individuals? 
A 
Q 
Officer? 
A 
Q 
A 
which con 
Q 
A 
substance 
object to 
Yes. 
Okay. Once you did that, what did you do, 
I began an inventory search of the vehicle. 
And what, if anything, did you find? 
I found a bag underneath the driver's seat 
— 
Describe that bag to us, if you would, please. 
It was a plastic bag that contained a whitish 
that appeared to me to be methamphetamine. 
MR. SCOWCROFT: Your Honor, I—I 
the characterization for the truth of it, that 
it is methamphetamine. 
THE COURT: Well, no, I mean, he just 
said it looks like it to me. 
MR. SCOWCROFT: Right. 
THE COURT: We'll see where it goes 
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from there. 
Q 
in that 
A 
bag. 
Q 
A 
Q 
purse? 
A 
Q 
(By Mr. Walsh) Was there anything else there 
bag? 
There was only the whitish substance in the 
Any other plastic baggies or anything? 
Not in that plastic bag, no. 
And did you conduct a search of Ms. Morgan's 
Yes. 
And what, if anything, did you find in the 
purse of— 
A I found several empty plastic bags, 
approximately one inch by one inch. 
Q 
A 
Q 
besides 
A 
Q 
A 
Have you seen that kind of stuff before? 
Yes. 
And did you find anything else in her purse 
those baggies, if you will? I 
Yes. 
What did you find in the purse? 
Found some other plastic, it appeared to be 
saran wrap type things that were balled up. Those items 
also contained a white—whitish substance. 
Q Okay. And did that appear to you to be 
something— 
10 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
A Yes, it did. 
MR. 
Honor, that's vague and 
clear question so 
foundation for it 
it appeared— 
Q (By Mr. 
THE 
SCOWCROFT: Well, objection, your 
there's no foundation for it. 
COURT: Well, it's a—it's a 
it's not vague, but there may be no 
I mean, I could agree there. 
MR. 
Walsh) 
THE 
WALSH: Okay. I'm just asking if 
Did you recognize— 
COURT: Well, but—but there's no 
foundation upon which he can base whether or not he had a 
recognition. 
Q (By Mr. 
all, sir? Or— 
Walsh) 
THE 
Did—did you recognize this at 
COURT: Right. If he doesn't, 
then we're okay, so—and if he does, we need a 
foundation. We can find out what it is. Okay. 
Did you 
wrap? 
Q (By Mr. 
recognize it, the stuff in the saran 
THE 
THE 
THE 
THE 
Walsh) 
recognition of that? I 
WITNESS: I ~ 
COURT: That's a yes or a no. 
WITNESS: Yes. 
COURT: Okay. 
? I 
And what was the basis for your 
mean, why—you—you thought it 
11 
5 
6 
10 
11 
1
 J was something, did you not? 
2
 I A Yes, I did. 
3 I 
• Q And why was it that you thought it was what you 
4
 I thought it was? 
THE COURT: Good. That's very good. 
THE WITNESS: It was packaged in a 
7
 manner consistent with narcotics. 
® I Q (By Mr. Walsh) Okay. And have you had some 
^ J training relative to the way narcotics are packaged, sir? 
A Yes. 
Q And was this consistent with narcotics 
12
 J trafficking, according to your training? 
13
 i A Yes. 
14
 I MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, again, 
1£> J foundation. There's no testimony as to what his training 
was, your Honor, so that's my objection. 
17
 I THE COURT: Well, now, find out what 
18
 I training he had. 
Q (By Mr. Walsh) What training have you had, 
sir, relative to the recognition of drugs? 
21
 A I've been trained with the Peace Officers 
22
 Standards and Training to recognize— 
23 Q And you graduated from that? 
2
* A Yes, I did. 
25
 Q And how long—and as part of that training, or 
12 
19 
20 
did part of that training involve drug recognition? 
A Yes. 
Q How it's packaged and how it's used and that 
sort of thing? 
A Yes. 
Q And how much of your training would this 
consist of, sir? 
A I'm sorry? 
Q How much training did you have on the—on the— 
on drugs and packaging and usage and—and that sort of 
thing? 
A I can't recall exactly the amount. It was 
addressed in a course at the police academy. 
Q Okay. How long did the course last? 
A I can recall one—one evening of training. 
Q Okay. And based upon your training then, what 
did this seem—appear to you to be? 
A A narcotic. 
Q What— 
A A drug. 
MR. SCOWCROFT: I—again, I object to 
that, but I think I've made my reasons clear. 
THE COURT: Great. 
MR. SCOWCROFT: Thanks. 
THE COURT: So, I'll overrule it. It 
13 
appears to him to be a narcotic. 
Q (By Mr. Walsh) Did you find anything else on 
the person or in her possession of Ms. Morgan? 
A I found a baggie in the glove box of the 
vehicle which appeared to be marijuana. 
Q And she was seated in the passenger seat? 
A Yes. She was. 
Q And she indicated to you that this was her 
vehicle? 
A Yes. 
MR. WALSH: May I approach the 
witness, Judge? 
THE COURT: You may. 
Q (By Mr. Walsh) Let me show you, Officer 
Lindquist, what's been marked as State's proposed Exhibit 
1, ask if you recognize that? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. Does that appear to be the toxicological 
report with respect to the controlled substances you 
found in the vehicle or on the person of Ms. Morgan? 
MR. SCOWCROFT: Your Honor, I'm going 
to object to him leading the witness. I—thanks. 
MR. WALSH: Calls for a yes or no, 
that's not necessarily leading. 
THE COURT: Well, yeah, I think it's 
14 
I not leading most of the time, but maybe today it is, 
2
 I but— 
3
 » MR. WALSH: Today it is? 
4
 THE COURT: —we probably need this 
5
 today, so I'll overrule it. 
* I Q (By Mr. Walsh) Does that appear to be the 
7 drugs—or the toxicological report with respect to the 
® I substances that you found on the person or in the vehicle 
of— 
(Tape change - some proceedings not recorded.) 
MR. SCOWCROFT: There's no way, he 
doesn't—I mean, is it the same case number or is there— 
is there any way to know this relates to this case in any 
way. 
THE COURT: Well— 
16
 MR. SCOWCROFT: There's no foundation 
17
 I for the response. 
THE COURT: —okay. And I'll 
overrule it. I think that's the kind of thing you ask on 
cross if you want to know about that. 
Q (By Mr. Walsh) And Officer, based upon your 
training and your experience, do you have an opinion as 
to why Ms. Morgan would possess these substances in these 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 quantities? 
25 A Based upon ray training and experience, it's my 
15 
12 
13 
1
 opinion that due to the amount and the bag found 
2
 underneath the seat and the other plastic baggies, that 
3
 that substance would probably be separated into smaller 
4
 bags and sold for profit• 
5 J MR. WALSH: No further questions. 
6
 THE COURT: Mr. Scowcroft? 
M MR. SCOWCROFT: Thank you, your 
8
 Honor. 
9
 CRQS3-EXAWINATI0N 
10
 BY MR, SCOWCROFT; 
11
 I Q It's Officer Lindquist? 
A Yes. 
Q How do you—how do you know that this exhibit 
14 here relates to the evidence that you gathered in this 
1
^ case? 
16 A There's an agency case number at the top which 
17
 refers to the case number. And also it has Anna Morgan 
18
 listed as the suspect. 
19
 MR. SCOWCROFT: Okay. Could I see 
2 0
 that? I've never received a copy of that. 
21 May I approach the witness, your Honor? 
22 THE COURT: You may. 
23 Q (By Mr. Scowcroft) Now#—all right. Were 
24 there any other police officers or other agents with you 
25 when you conducted the search of the car? 
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A Yes. 
Q And who was that? 
A Officer Scott Bennan. 
Q And what did Officer Bennan do? 
A He assisted in the inventory of the vehicle and 
also he was called there to assist in the arrest. 
Q All right. So, it was just the two of you? 
' A There was a Salt Lake County Deputy on the 
scene and I don't know who he was, he left when Officer 
Berman arrived. 
Q Did that officer—did the deputy participate in 
any way in the search of the vehicle or— 
A No. 
Q —the arrest of the parties? 
A No. 
Q To what—how do you identify the agency case 
number on the—on State's Exhibit 1 that you've just 
talked about? I mean, why does that number mean anything 
to you? What does it correspond to, if anything? 
A The number—the way I associated that with 
Murray Police Department case number 'cause it has 
Murray, a reference to Murray listed in the upper left 
corner on that paper. 
Q All right. So you know it's a Murray case, it 
could be any Murray case based on that piece of 
17 
I information? 
2 
1
 A It could, yes. 
3 I 
' Q All right. And the other way you believe that 
4
 I the—this—this Exhibit 1 relates to this case was the 
name of Anna Morgan? 
A Yes. 
Q Are there any other ways? Would you like to 
5 
6 
7 
8
 | see it? 
A Please. 
Q Are there any other ways that this, that you 
believe this document relates to the items that you found 
12
 | on that day? 
A No. 
Q May I take it, Officer? Thanks very much. 
MR. SCOWCROFT: If I could just have 
a moment, your Honor? I have not received a copy of this 
so I haven't had a chance to look at it. 
Q (By Mr. Scowcroft) So you—is it true that you 
found two bags containing what you believed was 
9 
10 
11 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20
 I methamphetamine? 
21 !
 A I believe I actually found four bags, total, 
22 
23 
24 
25 
containing that substance. One was underneath the—in 
her purse, I found three others. 
Q And but how were those three that you say you 
found in her purse packaged? I mean, was—was it all in 
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one and that was in another one, or can you describe 
what—what you saw? 
A I saw three separate smaller baggies or saran 
wrap is what they were or appeared to be and the—the 
three separate ones were packaged separately. 
Q And were they just loose? 
A Yes. 
Q So they were just sort of, kind of floating 
around separately in the purse, you say? 
A In a pocket of the purse, yes. 
Q All right. They were not in a bag? 
A No. 
Q You do not know what the weights of those three 
items were? 
A It's in my report. May I refer to that? 
Says that the total of the baggies and the 
bunched-up plastic wrap was five grams. 
Q Okay. And that's in your report, and what page 
are you referring to? 
A The first page. 
MR. SCOWCROFT: Could I approach 
again, your Honor? I'm sorry. Will you show me where it 
is? 
THE WITNESS: Right here. 
Q (By Mr. Scowcroft) Okay. All right. Okay. 
19 
And that—that's not what's reported on State's Exhibit 
1; correct? 
A No. 
Q And so what's on there is just 2.4 grams? 
A Yes. 
Q Why did you stop the vehicle? 
A I ran the registration on the vehicle. It 
indicated that it was not insured. 
Q All right. That's the only reason you stopped 
it? 
A I initially noticed the vehicle because it was 
driving with its lights off through a parking lot of a 
motel, which appeared suspicious to me, which is when I 
first noticed it, that's when I got behind the vehicle 
and ran the registration on it. 
Q Where—what did you do with the items that you 
seized from the car? 
A They were—they were placed in my trunk and 
left in my trunk until I got—I went to the jail from 
there, when I got back, they were placed in the Murray 
evidence. 
Q All right. And do you know where they are now? 
A No# I don't. 
Q What did Mr. Perry tell you? 
A The only comments that I recall and that were 
20 
placed in my report were that there was a needle which he 
found and he placed in his coat pocket. That's not an 
exact quote, but that's the only comments that I can 
recall him making. 
5
 I Q All right. And you—you in fact recovered a 
6
 I syringe— 
7
 ' A Uh huh. 
8
 I Q —and he told you it was his; correct? 
A Yeah. 
Q You don't recall— 
A He— 
Q I'm sorry. Go ahead. 
A I'm sorry. He didn't tell me it was his. He 
told me he had picked it 'cause he didn't want his kids 
to find it. 
Q Oh. And that's the only statement you recall 
17
 I from Mr. Perry? 
A Yes. Other than the information regarding who 
the vehicle belonged to. 
Q Did Ms. Morgan ask you to release the vehicle 
to her? 
A She told me that she was going to pick up her 
23 | kids from a movie theater and I don't recall her 
specifically making the request, but I—I'd have to say 
no, I don't, I don't recall that. 
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Q 
correct? 
A 
Q 
You asked for her identification, though; 
Yes. 
And you didn't suspect that she had committed 
any crime at that point— 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
that you 
A 
Q 
No. 
—isn't that correct? 
That's correct? 
That is correct. 
You, at—at some point, your report indicates 
advised Ms. Morgan of her Miranda warnings? 
Yes. 
How did you do that? Did you have a card you 
read from? 
A I have a card that I usually read from. I 
don't recall how I advised her. 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
It might have been that? 
Possibly. 
You—when did you do that? 
In my report, it states I did that after 
finding the—the baggies. 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
That's after you searched the vehicle? 
After I'd searched the vehicle. 
And you also searched the purse? 
My report says that I advised her prior to 
22 
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searching her purse. 
Q 
A 
Q 
for the 
A 
date of ' 
checked 
Q 
All right. But you did search her purse? 
Yes. 
When did you discover that there was a warrant 
arrest of Ms. Morgan? 
When I—after I asked her for her—her name and 
birth and I checked her driver's license and also 
for warrants at the same time. 
All right. Now, was that the first 
conversation you had with Ms. Morgan, that is to ask her 
name and 
name and 
A 
Q 
A 
when she 
her iden—ask for her identification and her 
— 
First— 
—and so forth? 
Excuse me. The first time she spoke to me was 
was still in the vehicle and she told me that 
the vehicle was hers and that it was insured. After 
that, after I had checked the driver and placed him into 
custody, 
Q 
A 
Q 
prior to 
car? 
A 
then I asked— 
All right. 
That's when I began speaking with her again. 
All right. So the only information you had 
that was what she'd told you about it being her 
Yes. 
23 
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Q And you—why did you demand her identification? 
A I didn't demand her identification, I asked for 
it. I checked the driver's license so that if her 
driver's license was valid, she could check—she could 
take the vehicle. 
Q Did you tell her that? 
A Yes. 
Q Where was the vehicle when you did all this? 
Where was the vehicle stopped? 
A It was stopped in the entrance, entrance and 
exit to the Hampton Inn. 
Q All right. So— 
A At 601 West 45th South. 
Q All right. Legally parked? 
A It wasn't parked, they were attempting to turn 
on to 45th South. 
Q All right. So it could have been parked, 
though, at the scene? 
A No. 
Q Why is that? 
A I—'cause I saw them driving it. I'm not sure 
what you're asking. 
Q Well, no, I—I'm just saying that it could have 
been legally parked at that area, it could have been— 
A Yes. 
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Q 
parked 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
because 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
--rather than impounded? They just could have 
it? 
Yes. 
Now, did you—you impounded the vehicle? 
Yes. 
Why did you do that? 
It was a hold for owner incident to arrest. 
All right. You—you impounded the vehicle 
you arrested the drivers? 
Yes. 
The driver? 
Yeah. The driver and the passenger. 
All right. And why did you search the car? 
As an inventory prior to impound. 
All right. Did you prepare an inventory sheet? 
Yeah. 
Do you have that with you? 
No. I do not. 
And do you know where that would be? 
No. 
Did you check the registration of the vehicle? 
Yes. 
And it was legally registered at the time? 
Yes. 
Why did you search the purse? 
25 
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A I had taken her into custody and because I 
didn't think the jail was going to take the purse and all 
its contents and so I did the—I did the inventory of 
that because I had planned to place it into Murray 
evidence, hold for owner. 
Q All right. Was—did you search the purse 
during the inventory of the car? 
A Yeah. 
Q Was the—the purse was in the car? 
A The purse was in the car. 
Q Okay. And so the entire search occurred during 
the course of searching the car prior to the impound; is 
that correct? 
A Yes. 
Q The—where—can you describe where in the purse 
you found the—the items you've mentioned? 
A In a side pocket. 
Q Everything was in a side pocket of the purse? 
A The—the baggies were, yes. 
Q And the—and that's where you say you found the 
three items that looked like narcotics to you? 
A Yes. 
Q Was it—can you describe what the purse looked 
like? I mean, was it a—what's the side pocket look 
like? Did it have a cover on it or was it open? 
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A I don't recall. 
j Q The purse, you believe the purse is in evidence 
at this time? 
A I—I don't know. 
Q Do you recall where, in the side pocket, you 
found these items? Was it in the top, was it in the 
bottom, was it in the side? 
A I don't recall, I just recall that it was in a 
side pocket. 
Q Okay. Did you submit these items for 
toxicological testing, yourself? 
A I placed them into Murray evidence. I don't 
recall if I made a request that it be tested. 
Q Would—you do not know what items were 
submitted for testing? 
A I know that the contents of the three of the 
baggies were submitted. 
Q You've talked about some other baggies, though; 
correct? You found some other baggies? 
A Yes. 
Q And you don't know if those were tested or not 
for the presence of controlled substance? 
A Which baggies? I'm not sure which ones you 
mean. 
Q Well, you testified, did you not, that you 
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found some baggies that were empty or— 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
Yes. 
All right. And those were not tested? 
No. 
All right. Those didn't appear to have any 
controlled substance in them? 
A 
Q 
' A 
Q 
No. 
Is that correct? 
Yes. 
So the only—the only items that you believe 
might contain a controlled substance were the bag under 
the front 
A 
Q 
seat, driver's seat; correct? 
Correct. 
And the three small packets you found in the 
purse; correct? 
A 
Q 
you? 
a report 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
Correct. And also the one in the glove box. 
Oh. What statements did Ms. Morgan make to 
Let me ask you another question. You prepared 
in this case? 
Yes. 
Is that your only report? 
Yes. 
Okay. Do you recall what Ms. Morgan said to 
you, other than what you've already told us, about it 
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being her car and—what did she say about the purse? 
A That it was hers. 
Q Anything else about it? 
A I believe I recall her saying something to the 
effect that Joseph Perry put the stuff in her purse. 
Q That's in your report. 
A Okay. 
Q All right. Do you recall anything else she 
said to you? 
A I don't. 
Q Now, you ask—what did you ask her after you 
read her the Miranda warnings? 
A I believe that I asked her if the purse was 
hers. 
Q All right. Now, anything else you asked her at 
that time? 
A I don't recall. 
Q Now, where was the—the vehicle impounded, do 
you have any knowledge of that? 
A It's in another supplemental report done by 
another officer, if I can refer to that. 
Q Sure. Did you—did you observe the vehicle 
being towed? 
A I did. 
Q You didn't make any effort to locate any other 
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person to take the vehicle? 
A No. 
Q Now, did you—you say you did fill out an 
inventory sheet? 
' A If I recall correctly, Officer Berman filled 
out the inventory sheet. 
Q Okay. So if it occurred, he would have done 
it, not you; is that true? 
A It—one was filled out and yes, he did it. 
Q All right. 
MR. SCOWCROFT: If I could just have 
a moment, your Honor? 
THE COURT: You may. 
(Off the record.) 
Q (By Mr. Scowcroft) You made a—you called Ms. 
Morgan's mother to go pick up her kids; correct? 
A Yes. 
Q And you didn't ask her to get the car, though? 
A I don't believe I did, no. 
Q All right. 
MR. SCOWCROFT: I think that's all I 
have. Thank you very much, Officer Lindquist. 
THE COURT: Mr. Walsh, do you 
anything else? 
* 
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REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MRt WALSH; 
Q Officer, in your report, you indicated that you 
weighed the plastic bags that were found in her purse. 
A Yes. 
Q And—and I assume the contents of those 
baggies? 
A Yes. 
Q And that that was 5.1 grams? 
A I have five grams, in my report. 
Q Five grams, I'm sorry. 
In— 
MR. WALSH: If I may approach, Judge. 
14
 I Q (By Mr. Walsh) Just bringing your attention to 
State's proposed Exhibit 1 referring to Item 2 there, it 
doesn't appear that they weighed the plastic along with 
15 
16 
1
^ I the contents when they weighed the—the controlled 
1
^ ' substance, did they? 
19
 I MR. SCOWCROFT: Objection, your 
20
 ' Honor. He wouldn't know that. 
21
 | THE COURT: I think he probably is 
22
 I not going to know that, is he, Mr. Walsh? 
23 
24 
25 
MR. WALSH: Well, other than what it 
says there, Judge. 
THE COURT: Well, okay. I guess 
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anybody can read it, though; right? 
MR. WALSH: Right. 
THE COURT: It speaks for itself. 
MR. WALSH: Never—never mind, 
Officer. 
Q (By Mr. Walsh) I—you—you weighed the 
contents and the plastic when you came up with the five 
grams? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. All right. 
MR. WALSH: No further questions. 
I'd move for the admission of State's Exhibit 1, Judge. 
THE COURT: Any objection to No. 1 
14
 for today's purposes, Mr. Scowcroft? 
15
 I MR. SCOWCROFT: Not for today's 
purposes, your Honor. I mean, I think it's subject to 16 
^ some dispute, but I do not object to its admission. 
18 
19 
20 
21 
THE COURT: No. l's in and any 
questions else of—of the officer? 
MR. SCOWCROFT: Nothing further, your 
Honor. Thank you very much, sir. 
22
 I THE COURT: Thanks, Officer 
23
 I Lindquist. 
MR. WALSH: Submit it, Judge, subject 
to any argument of counsel. 
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1
 THE COURT: Mr. Scowcroft? 
2
 I MR. SCOWCROFT: Your Honor, the— 
* ' THE COURT: I guess, formally, you 
4
 have told Ms.— 
5
 MR. SCOWCROFT: Right. That's true, 
6
 I've told Ms. Morgan— 
' THE COURT: —she could testify and 
® could present evidence? 
9
 I MR. SCOWCROFT: —she has the right 
to testify. 
I'm advising you not to, Ms. Morgan. Will you 
"*
2
 | take my advice in that regard? 
13
 I MS. MORGAN: Uh huh. 
14
 I THE COURT: She's agreeing with you 
15
 I there and so you're resting as well? 
16
 I MR. SCOWCROFT: That's correct. 
17
 I THE COURT: Okay. Argument, Mr. 
18
 Scowcroft? 
19
 I MR. SCOWCROFT: I think there's 
insufficient evidence regarding Count 1 of intent to 
distribute. Distribute has been interpreted in statute 
as to deliver. I believe there's no—despite the 
testimony that these items were there, despite that there 
were apparently three small packets in her purse, that 
25 does not rise to the level of an intent to distribute to 
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1 another party. 
o I 
* I Clearly it rises, for the purpose of this 
1
 hearing, to the level of possessing it, but there's no 
4
 evidence of any intention or attempt to deliver it, 
5
 distribute. And I—I believe more is required than 
6
 simply possessing amount—an amount that could possibly 
' be distributed because anything could be distributed. 
® There is no evidence of an attempt or intent to deliver 
9
 I it to another party, 
There is no actual possession of marijuana, 
that's Count 2. It was in the glove box. I would say 
her being a passenger in the car at that time when it was 
found does not rise to the level of constructive 
14
 J possession on her part. 
15
 I I think that's my—my argument, your Honor, so 
16
 I I would move to amend Count 1 to possession of a 
17
 controlled substance, a third-degree felony, and move to 
18
 dismiss Count 2. 
19
 I THE COURT: Mr. Walsh? 
MR. WALSH: I disagree, Judge, but 
10 
11 
12 
13 
20 
21
 I ' l l submit i t . 
22 
23 
24 
THE COURT: Okay. Well, I guess at 
this juncture, I'd have to agree with Mr. Scowcroft, I 
don't have any evidence that there's any distribution, so 
25
 w e bind Ms. Morgan over for the Count 1, which is now 
34 
I amended to a third-degree felony, unlawful possession of 
p 1
 a controlled substance. 
3 I 
And I think on the—the possession of the 
4
 marijuana, Mr. Scowcroft, there's evidence sufficient to 
5
 bind her over on that one as well. 
6
 So those two counts, the third degree and the B 
7
 misdemeanor for Judge Fratto and I guess it's a 
8
 scheduling conference to enter a not guilty plea. And 
9
 I the day that he could do it looks to be—he could do it 
the 14th, if you want it, a week tomorrow. 
MR. SCOWCROFT: Your Honor, I'm in a-
-a murder trial that day, frankly. 
THE COURT: How about June 11th? 
MR. SCOWCROFT: Rather be here, but— 
is June 11th going to work for you? That would be just 
16
 fine, your Honor, 
17
 THE COURT: Are you okay on that, Mr. 
18
 I Walsh? 
MR. WALSH: I am, Judge. 
THE COURT: See you here then. 
MR. SCOWCROFT: What time is that? 
THE COURT: Oh, I'm sorry. 8:30. 
MR. SCOWCROFT: All right. Could— 
I've got a 9:30 hearing with Judge Fratto, is there any 
possibility we could set it about that time? Would that 
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work for you? It would— 
THE COURT: He's supposed to set 
these at 8:30. 
MR. SCOWCROFT: Okay. That's fine. 
THE COURT: Shame on him. So 9:30. 
MR. SCOWCROFT: Okay. Great. Thank 
you, thank you very much. 
THE COURT: 9:30's fine, yeah, I mean 
if he's got one already. 
MR. WALSH: Judge, can I speak about 
a pro—a procedural matter on— 
THE COURT: A promotion? 
MR. WALSH: A motion. 
THE COURT: Oh, I thought you said a 
promotion. 
MR. WALSH: No, a procedural matter 
on this. 
THE COURT: Procedure, not promotion. 
MR. WALSH: Judge, my—my 
recollection of the officer's testimony was that in his 
judgment, he felt that the quantity and the packaging was 
sufficient. 
THE COURT: He did, didn't he? 
MR. WALSH: And I assumed that that 
would be sufficient for this Court to— 
36 
1
 ' THE COURT: The reason that wasn't to 
2
 me is that the only foundation I had is he might have 
3
 had—he might have had an evening's worth of instruction 
4
 somewhere; but I guess even for probable cause, I was 
5
 feeling like there wasn't enough foundation for any 
6
 opinion he came to. 
7
 I If I had a little more experience or a little 
® more instruction or something that the officer had, but 
® J all I got was that one evening, and the second thing is, 
I didn't get anything from the officer in support of the 
opinion, it was just kind of a bare opinion. 
If I could say—if he had said, well, you know, 
how many are we going, .36—36 grams, I think—and I 
guess the problem is my own ignorance, I don't—I don't 
have a clue how much 36 grams is and I don't know how 
much a person uses on their own, you know, that could be 
17
 I 36 every week. I—I don't know that and so I didn't have 
18
 I any—I didn't have a lot of foundation from him and I 
19
 I didn't have a reason why his opinion was what it was; so 
all I had was his opinion. 
MR. WALSH: Okay. And—and— 
22
 I THE COURT: Kind of abstract. 
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MR. WALSH: —and that—and 
24
 understanding that now, see, and in my—I had thought 
that because that evidence had come in, there may have 
37 
been sufficient evidence, I do have Officer Hansen and 
have spoken to him about this as the detective in the 
case and I would like to present, if not today, perhaps 
at a future date, some additional evidence on why a 
5
 person would possess that quantity under these 
6
 circumstances. 
' J THE COURT: And what I—and luckily, 
see, I can say, go talk to Judge Fratto about that, 
9 'cause we've tossed it over to him. 
10 
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MR. WALSH: See, unfortunately we 
can't— 
THE COURT: Oh. 
MR. WALSH: —because you have only 
bound it over as a simple possession— 
THE COURT: That's true. So I guess 
you— 
MR. WALSH: — s o — s o — 
THE COURT: So I guess we'll both 
learn from that one, is that okay? 
MR. WALSH: So what we'll do is, I 
will just make a motion before Judge Fratto— 
THE COURT: You're going to dismiss 
23
 I and then refile? 
24 MR* WALSH: —to—not necessarily 
25 that, have him remand it— 
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THE COURT: I don't know what—oh. 
MR. WALSH: —to this Court. 
I THE COURT: Let's see what he does. 
MR. WALSH: And—and see, there is a J 
case and we just in fact were over arguing another case 
before Judge Fratto on— 
THE COURT: Playing the same game, 
huh? 
MR. WALSH: —kind of the same thing 
and—and unfortunately, Ms. Mann took my copy of that 
case in which they talk about a prosecutor thinking that 
he's put on enough evidence when he hasn't— 
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. WALSH: —and so, you know, is— 
is the prosecution bound or can they come back before the 
same magistrate. 
THE COURT: What did they think on 
that? 
MR. WALSH: They—they said that we 
could come back, we have to come back before the same 
magistrate and whether we re—in that case, the case was-
-went up to the District Court and was dismissed, then 
they came back to the—to—I guess Circuit Court back in 
those days. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
39 
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MR. WALSH: And they said that it was 
all right to come back, you had to come back before the 
Q I 
I same judge and either on a re-file—well, that—those 
4
 • were the circumstances, they didn't talk about other 
5
 means to come back, but just said that it was appropriate 
w
 I to come back and present additional evidence. 
THE COURT: Oh, okay. 
MR. WALSH: And so given my 
® experience with this quantity,— 
10 
11 
THE COURT: Is it better then maybe 
today to just backtrack a little bit and take under 
12
 I advisement this decision on whether to bind it over and 
1
^ I have you file this motion and Mr. Scowcroft have an 
14
 ' opportunity to meet it and talk about it? 
MR. WALSH: True. 
THE COURT: Is that maybe 
17
 I procedurally how we preserve what you think you have and 
then we don't get it further appealed? 
MR. WALSH: I—I would prefer that, 
Judge, rather—it saves everybody a little time. 
15 
16 
18 
19 
20 
21
 I THE COURT: We'll see how it works. 
22
 I I mean, we're not sure what you'll have but—and what 
23 
24 
25 
you'll respond to; so maybe what we ought to do is hold 
this one and come back on June 3rd and you will have 
filed your motion, he'll be ready to address it and we'll 
40 
1
 see if—and June 3rd will be just the day to talk about 
2
 whether we're going to hear more, not to hear it that 
3
 day, but are you—do you have legal grounds to open it up 
4
 I again and hear more. 
Am I clear on that? 
6
 I MR. WALSH: That will be fine. 
^ THE COURT: Is that clear to you, Mr. 
3
 I Scowcroft, what I'm— 
9
 I MR. SCOWCROFT: June 3rd at what 
10
 I time? 
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THE COURT: 1:30. 
12
 MR. SCOWCROFT: Okay. 
THE COURT: So, Ms. Morgan can come 
if she wants but that becomes just really a legal issue 
and on the facts, we're not going to hear any facts that 
day but we're just going to hear legally whether or not 
1
^ I we can hear—open it again for more. 
18
 I MR. WALSH: Yes, sir. 
19
 | THE COURT: And if we can, if we 
20
 I decide that's the way it's going to go, then we'll set a 
21 I day for that to happen. 
MR. WALSH: Okay. 
23
 I THE COURT: Okay? 
24
 | MR. WALSH: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Now, I do have Exhibit 1 
41 
1
 I and Linda will hand that down to you. 
2 I 
1
 So, we're not binding it over, Linda, when we 
3 I 
get it all in there, we're just going to see them on June 
4
 3rd to talk about that legal issue. 
* I (Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.) 6 
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